

DDA Registry
File DFMS

Strategic Warning and Crisis Management Staff

DDA 76-4663

John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

20 SEP 1976

DDCI

Hank:

In your memorandum of 19 August 1976 to the members of the Executive Advisory Group, you asked that the DDA take under consideration the problem of staffing of a strategic warning and crisis management staff. I discussed this matter with Jim Taylor, who stated that he felt that this was a problem that the Comptroller might more appropriately address. I am, therefore, forwarding to you the Comptroller's response, which indicates the problems inherent in establishing the staff.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

Attachment

STATINTL

EO/DDA [redacted]:1m (20 Sept 76)
Distribution.

Orig RS - DDCI w/att
① RS - DDA Subject w/att
1 RS - DDA Chrono
1 RS - RFZ Chrono

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Background:
DDA 76-4195, Memo for Members of the Executive Advisory Group, dated 19 Aug, from DDCI re strategic warning and crisis management areas. w/att.
Att: Memo for DDCI from [redacted] dated 12 Aug 76, Subject: Review of Strategic Warning Staff and Support of It by Agency Elements.

Attachment: DDA 76-4663, Memo for ADDA from [redacted] Asst Comptroller, Resources, dated 15 Sept 76, Subject: Review of Strategic Warning Staff and Support of It by Agency Elements

SECRET

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SSA-DD/A Registry
76-6724
15 SEP 1976

DD/A Registry
76-4663

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Administration

THROUGH : Comptroller

SUBJECT : Review of Strategic Warning Staff and Support of It by Agency Elements

REFERENCE : Memo to DDCI from [redacted] dtd. 12 Aug 76,
Same Subject

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1. The Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) "staffing problem", described in the referenced paper, deserves some careful consideration. Strategic warning is, of course, a very vital function of longstanding concern to this Agency and to the Intelligence Community. Over the years there has been considerable debate over the extent to which this function could be carried out effectively by those who are regularly involved in other aspects of intelligence analysis. However, the consensus has been, and I believe still is, that: (a) this is basically a community function, and (b) it requires the regular analytical efforts of a small but well-qualified interagency team dedicated exclusively to the problem of strategic warning.

2. I can appreciate the advantages of establishing a formal TO with the required positions for this staff which would be filled by Community representatives as well as some number of CIA analysts. This would allow the Director of SWS to exercise greater control over the selection of individuals for this staff and would demonstrate a commitment by the DCI and DDCI to strengthen the effort against the strategic warning problem.

3. As to the number of positions, I would agree that ten or so seems to be an ideal number for this interagency staff. For our part, this Agency already has four slots (including the Chief) allocated to this effort. With the two DIA, two NSA, and one Air Force analysts already on board and the Army and Marine Corps personnel (one each) being added, the Staff will have a total strength of ten professionals/military officers plus one clerical.

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4. Under [redacted] proposal, the SWS would be placed in the DCI area, presumably under the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning. In this event, the four CIA positions presently allocated to this effort (in OCI) could be readily transferred. Unfortunately, the prospects for coming up with the six new positions needed, at this particular time, are just about nil in view of the extremely tight position situation which this Agency has for 1977.

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IMPDET CL BY: <i>Signer</i>

5. On the other hand, with the number of analysts already on board and being added to the SWS, I don't get a sense of great urgency for the proposed change in staffing. While it is really too late to include this request for positions in our 1977 Operating Plan or 1978 OMB Budget, it could be given a high priority for 1978, if the DDCI deems this appropriate.

6. Another alternative would be to look to the IC Staff to absorb this activity because of its interagency make-up and community-wide responsibility. But I am not optimistic that such an arrangement could be worked out anytime soon.



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Assistant Comptroller, Resources

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